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Abstract
In its rational, organisational, historical and discursive varieties, the
new institutionalism research agenda is arguably the most successful
paradigm in comparative politics and public policy analysis. However,
neo-institutional practice applied to comparative policy analysis reveals
four pitfalls, that is, ‘institutional determinism’, ‘drop in the box’, ‘second
best residual explanations’ and ‘theoretical conjectures without founda-
tional mechanisms’. We illustrate and examine the pitfalls and consider
the conceptual and methodological implications for the comparative
analysis of policies. In the conclusion, we present options for rescuing
institutional analysis from bad practice.
Keywords new institutionalism; comparative public policy; research
methods; pitfalls
In its rational, organisational, histor-ical and discursive varieties, the newinstitutionalism research agenda is
arguably the most successful paradigm
in comparative politics and public policy
analysis (Di Maggio and Powell, 1991;
March and Olsen, 1984, 1989; Schmidt,
2008; Shepsle, 2006; Steinmo et al,
1992). The theoretical and substantive
achievements of new institutionalist
research are not disputed here. Rather,
we are concerned with specific negative
implications of new institutionalist think-
ing in a specific field of research, that
is, the comparative analysis of public
policy. Obviously, there are several
angles that can be used to appraise what
new institutionalism has delivered –
comparative public policy being only one
of these, although not a trivial one.
We argue that there are four pitfalls of
new institutionalist research in comparative
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public policy analysis that show up fre-
quently in articles published in major
journals. These pitfalls do not derive from
wrong assumptions or problems internal
to neo-institutionalism (NI). Instead,
they are the consequence of NI usages.
The problem – we reason – is that we use
NI in comparative public policy to justify a
number of practices that, upon scrutiny,
are not justified – neither by social
scientific standards nor by the NI’s own
theoretical and methodological premises.
We therefore conclude that we have to
go back to the research problems
that originally inspired the new institu-
tionalist paradigm and suggest a way
forward.
It is useful to clarify the arguments
we do NOT make. We are not concerned
with the study of institutions, govern-
ments, elections, regional integration
and many other topics that are prominent
on the agenda of political scientists
and international relations scholars.
We do not deny the importance of
neo-institutional frameworks that have
demonstrated the importance of institu-
tional design for public policy outcomes –
there is plenty of evidence showing
a robust causal link between design ele-
ments such as veto-players and policy
outcomes (Tsebelis, 2002). We realise
that social scientists often have to
make the choice between radically sim-
plifying assumptions in large-N studies
and resource-intensive case studies –
conceptual frameworks play a fundamen-
tal role in easing this trade off. Neither do
we take issue with the notion that the
institutional context builds up a large
causal effect over time, and therefore, it
is indispensable for comparative statics.
Finally, we are agnostic as to whether the
problems we discuss here are general
political science problems or are typical
of institutional analysis – to answer this
question, one would need a major survey
of the whole discipline of political science.
Even within NI, we simply want to prove
that the pitfalls simply exist, but since this
article does not contain a survey of a
representative sample of NI articles we
cannot say how diffuse the malaise is.
We do hope that what we say resonates
as common practice to the readers, but
only future work will be able to establish
the diffusion (within NI) of the pitfalls we
describe.
Let us also clarify the meaning of pitfall.
Following Majone’s Anatomy of Pitfalls,
a pitfall, differently from fallacies and
simple errors, can be understood as
‘a conceptual error into which, because of
its specious plausibility, people frequently
and easily fall’. It is ‘the taking of a false
logical path’ that may lead the unwary to
absurd conclusions, a hidden mistake
capable of destroying the validity of an
entire argument’ (Majone, 1980: 7).
There are different types of pitfalls. Some
are conceptual: Majone has repeatedly
argued that a unit made up of a number of
entities does not necessarily have the
properties of these constitutive entities.
So, if we approach the European Union by
assuming that this ‘unit’ has the same
structural features of its member states,
we produce a conceptual pitfall. Pitfalls
may also affect formulation, modelling,
data analysis and methods. In short, a
pitfall is not a fallacy like a numerical error
or a factual mistake (Majone, 1980). It is
an error that ‘vitiates the basic structure
of the underlying argument’ (Majone,
1980: 7).
We proceed as follows. In the second
section, we review the main original aims
of NI and situate our critique within the
other critical remarks made on NI in the
past. We then move to the illustration
of the pitfalls with examples from the NI
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literature, and elaborate on them. Finally,
we discuss the implications of the pitfalls
and turn to categories that, we believe,
may rescue NI from its indiscriminate
adoption and usage.
THE PROMISE OF NI AND
THE FOUR PITFALLS
As mentioned, there are different new
institutionalist approaches – sociological/
organisational, rational-choice, historical
– that can be distinguished on the basis of
the specific role attributed to institutions
and to their relations with other compo-
nents of political life. Recently, Vivien
Schmidt has made the point that a
fourth, discursive, institutionalism pro-
vides theoretical leverage and can use-
fully accompany the three other strands
(Schmidt, 2008, 2010). We do not need
to rehearse one more time why and how
the different fields of NI differ, since
this has been done very well by Hall and
Taylor (1996) and Schmidt (2010).
Fundamentally, NI scholars of all camps
have reopened the way for a theory-
grounded consideration of institutions in
structuring political life and influencing
human agency within organisational con-
figurations. Over the last three decades,
the NI Schools have collectively estab-
lished a grip on the key issues of com-
parative analysis – no matter how bitter
the internal disagreement among schools
may be.
NI theorists have provided explanations
that account for both variations in policy
outcomes in several countries (Hall,
1986; Immergut, 1998; Levi, 1988;
North, 1990; Shepsle, 1986; Steinmo
et al, 1992; Tsebelis, 1990) and policy
continuity and change within countries
(Skowronek, 1982; Weaver and Rockman,
1993; Weir, 1993). No matter what type
of institutionalism one sticks to, there is
nothing in the core research agenda we
have presented above that justifies the
type of pitfalls we are about to encounter.
Ironically, these practices are indeed
closer to the ‘old’ institutionalist agenda
than to the ‘new’.
Criticisms of NI have already appeared,
especially concerning the logic of NI
explanation in the different strands
(Green and Shapiro, 1994; Gorges,
2001; see a range of criticisms in
Schmidt, 2010). However, these critiques
have less to say about NI than about
the specific limitations of the variants
that inform it. They are first and foremost
critiques of rational choice, historical
analysis and sociological thinking – the
concern with institutional features is
secondary. The NI variants or strands
have become a veritable methodological
battleground (Schmidt, 2010). Despite
sharing the idea that institutional vari-
ables are central in the explanation of
political action, new institutionalisms
substantially differ in their object of
explanation and in the logic they assume
for explaining political phenomena.
The criticisms that have appeared in
the literature, however, do not affect
the problems we are concerned with –
problems that affect the approach to the
comparative analysis of public policy –
and therefore have less to do with grand
debates about the logic of explanation
and modes of analysis. Essentially,
we identify the following pitfalls:
INSTITUTIONAL DETERMINISM
The formal characters of the government,
associated with fixed institutional charac-
teristics, are considered the determinants
of policy outcomes. This is arguably the
only pitfall that we can strictly associate
with NI practice. The following pitfalls
appear in NI scholarly work, but they
may also feature in general political
science – as we said in the introduction,
we cannot establish this without a com-
prehensive survey of the literature.
claudio m. radaelli et al european political science: 11 2012 539
DROP IN THE BOX
Some important strands of NI operate
via typologies and classifications. These
typologies often arise out of heuristics.
For us, the problem does not lie in using
classification, but in the assumptions
made about institutional variables and
public policies. To put it bluntly, but we
shall elaborate below, the pitfall has two
dimensions. First, since the chosen ap-
proach has N boxes, each case must fall in
one of the pre-assigned boxes. Second,
the classificatory exercise is given an
explanatory power that it does not have




This pitfall is about acknowledging the
role of policy-level variables in the
conceptual section of an article, but
then using institutional variables instead.
This is because structural/institutional
variables, basically, seem to fill the gap
between the total variation of the selected
cases and the amount of variation ex-
plained by the policy-level variables. As
we shall see, there are also practical
problems concerning the generation of
policy-level data. Since producing the
data that the conceptual foundations
would require is extremely time consum-
ing, the authors prefer to condense
several features of a given policy system





Again, we put it bluntly to explain our
label (but we shall return to this category
in detail): since we have a neo-institu-
tional approach, we have to shoehorn any
policy outcome into the approach. But the
approach does not provide any argument
in terms of mechanisms leading to the
observed policy outcomes.
To repeat, these problems originate in
the practice of NI rather than in the
founding texts of this approach. Indeed,
our argument is that the practice that
informs the pitfalls of analysis is con-
nected to old institutionalist thinking and
it is not justified by the NI own standards
and theoretical premises.
HOW THE PITFALLS OCCUR
IN NI PRACTICE
Our first pitfall is institutional determin-
ism. Here, the formal characteristics of
the government, associated with fixed
institutional characteristics, become the
determinants of policy outcomes. Usually,
these studies are backed by the use of
extended databases and state-of-the-art
statistical analysis.
These articles often build on a tradition
in political economy that investigates
the determinants of budget deficit and
fiscal outcomes (Alesina et al, 1999;
De Haan and Sturm, 1997; Edin and
Ohlsson, 1991; Grilli et al, 1991; Roubini
and Sachs, 1989; Stein et al, 1998;
von Hagen and Harden, 1995), inflation
rates (Crouch, 1985; Bruno and Sachs,
1985) or the level of taxation and eco-
nomic performance (Alvarez et al, 1991;
Lehner, 1988; Lange and Garrett, 1985).
Thus, Cheibub (2006) maintains that
the budget deficit, on balance, is smaller
in presidential than in parliamentary
democracies. This, his argument goes
on, is the resultant of the high degree of
‘y these problems
originate in the practice
of NI rather than in the
founding texts of this
approach’.
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the institutionally guaranteed electoral
identifiability that keeps the president
accountable for performance. Therefore,
what actually matters is the relationship
between voters and the government and
the positioning of policy responsibility,
not the party structure, the minority or
majority nature of governments or the
electoral system in force.
Other authors have claimed that
changes in a specific policy sector are
explained by the institutional ‘context’ –
variously modelled. Hence, differences
in the way the US and Canada dealt
with children environmental health are
functions of the different structure of
the Congress, past policy legacies and
the influence of institutions on non-
governmental actors (Boothe and Harrison,
2009). Others have produced evi-
dence linking deficits and fragmentation
(partisan and procedural) (Wehner, 2010)
or between the total tax revenue and
the character of governments, which
are classified in terms of majoritarian,
shifting coalition and dominant coalition
(Steinmo and Tolbert, 1998).
This practice links the starting point of
the causal chain and the policy outcomes
with a plausible conjecture, ignoring
that the chain is very long, with several
intervening variables that can interrupt it
or alter its outcomes. The unit-of-analysis
problem is recurrent in this pitfall: institu-
tional features determine policies, so a
Presidential system will produce more or
less the same outcomes across policies –
ignoring the cross-policy variability that
certainly exists.
Our second pitfall is drop in the box. In
this case, the approach foresees a certain
number of boxes – usually via typological
exercises originally built in heuristic
manner – corresponding to as many
institutional compounds. We can see im-
mediately the problem that, when we
move to the initial heuristic exercise that
originated the ‘boxes’, every new case has
to be shoehorned into the existing
N types. But there is another problem
related to the explanation of public policy.
In fact, at the root of this pitfall is the
habit of turning a Weberian ideal type
into a causal explanation of public policy.
Ideal types are useful for classification,
but do not provide causal explanations
of policy outcomes.1 An example is the
Varieties of Capitalism approach (VoC)
(Hall, 2007; Hall and Gingerich, 2009;
Hall and Thelen, 2006; Hall and Soskice,
2001; Thelen, 2004). The problem is not
VoC per se, but how it is used to explain
policy outcomes.2
Suppose one is explaining privatisation,
vocational training and corporate govern-
ance in a comparative project. Or that
one is looking at the responses (in differ-
ent policy sectors) of Member States to
European Union initiatives – or to global
pressures on domestic policy regimes.
Since the chosen approach (in our
example VoC) has N boxes, each case,
as coupled with a specific set of policy
outcomes, must fall in one of the
pre-assigned boxes (Thelen and van
Wijnbergen, 2003). Therefore, individual
countries are identified with the theore-
tical features of ‘coordinated market
economies’ or instead ‘liberal market
economies’ (Soskice, 1999), and in turn
thought to be leading to specific sets of
policy outcomes. Thus, for instance, a
coordinated market economy would be
less likely to privatise its industries than
Great Britain, which instead is matched
with the character of a Liberal market
model. Hopner and Shafer (2007) argue
that the proposal of the European Com-
mission for a directive on the liberal-
isation of services across the European
Union created a clash of capitalisms
between coordinated market economies
and liberal market economies – the two
classic VoC boxes. Hence, we can explain
different responses by the member
States of the European Union by putting
individual countries into the pre-
fabricated types.
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In other cases, the type of political
regime (liberal or non-liberal democra-
cies) is considered as the independent
variable to explain cross-national differ-
ence in the scope, character, develop-
ment and impact of interest groups
regulation at the national level (Yshai,
1998). Here, the analysis lacks micro-
foundations. The inference made is
rather approximate. Policy sector-level
variables are left aside. But let us go
straight to the specific problem we have
with dropping cases into boxes.
First, when we move from the well-
known countries like the UK and Germany
and consider new ones, we are forced
to drop the new units into one of the
boxes – this applies to VoC as well as
other classifications, like Presidential-
Parliamentary democracies. Yet, the fit
between the chosen box and the country
may be very low. The result is a kind of
ugly duckling phenomenon: the country
is somewhat associated with one of the
boxes where it shows up as a poor
performer in relation to the institutional
properties of the box. Yet it could provide
an example of creative combination of
institutional features that do not add up
to any known box – it can be a beautiful
swan in a box we still have to find and
describe. Indeed, this is what happened
with the evolution of VOC from two
original types to richer varieties to cover
countries like France, Spain and Italy,
calling them mixed market economies
(MMEs); MMEs do not help much concep-
tually, although they have a heuristic
value (Hancke` et al, 2007: chapter 1).
Second, but most importantly for our
argument, there is no theoretical justifi-
cation that links the box to the phenom-
enon. There is no VoC theory connecting
institutional features to privatisation or
other policy outcomes. Obviously, VoC is
not a theory of privatisation or liberal-
isation and does not provide any
theorised mechanism about privatisation
choices. Consequently, the pitfall does
not lie in the use of categories and types,
but in assuming that the categories
contain underlying arguments about
policy-level explanations.
Third, the variables used to create the
boxes are often continuous. Countries do
not have either centralised or decentra-
lised wage bargaining, they have a more
or less (de)centralised wage bargaining
system. Think of the difficulties we en-
counter when it comes to Switzerland
within the VoC approach, or Japan. We
also encounter conceptual difficulties
when variables are continuous over time
in the single country. What happens when
Britain moves closer to a multiparty
parliament and coalition governments?
In sum, the practice of dropping countries
into the box(es) has no theoretical
leverage and leads to wrong prediction
because of the uncontrolled classification
bias and measurement problems.3
Yet another pitfall looms large when
scholars resort to institutional factors
to explain policy results without explicitly
stating the relevance of institutional
variables at the outset of their analyses.
In these cases, neo-institutionalism
serves as a sort of second best approach
to explanation, where institutional vari-
ables are initially listed together with
policy-level variables (i.e., constellation
of actors, policy coalitions, etc. y), but
eventually used as major explanatory
variables due to lack of information on
policy-level variables.
Let us look at work produced by one of
the authors of this article – to show how
easy it is to fall into a pitfall. Radaelli0s
article on regulatory reform (Radaelli,
2010) is a case in point. He first puts
forward the likelihood that cross-country
variance is explained by factors such as
knowledge utilisation, diffusion of public
management reforms and rational deci-
sion making, but eventually he falls back
on classic categories of comparative
politics, like coordination within central
government, the nature of executive
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government, ministerial relations and
administrative models. A more coherent
explanation could have instead consid-
ered the structures of problems and the
nature of the interaction networks within
the various sectors of policy to which
economic appraisals of legislation are
utilised. Situations like this due to the
lack of extended information about the
policy variables initially mentioned by the
researcher, who finds it more convenient
to make use of well-known categories to
reach plausible – but not necessarily
correct – inference.
This is indeed nowadays very classic
in comparative research, even almost
typical in large N research, where the
data available on public policy as depen-
dent variable are limited (typically an
outcome variable, such as levels of com-
pliance with legislation or levels of pollu-
tion or expenditure in the sector). There
is little comparative knowledge on the
features of the sector, including capacity,
the structure of conflict, the degree of
enforcement and implementation. By
contrast, we have plenty of measures at
the level of institutions, for instance, on
the executive structure, on the relation-
ship between the government and the
Parliament, on the electoral laws, on veto
players and so on.
Thus, comparative researchers tend to
use these to identify and measure the
independent variables, plus control vari-
ables. But if we look closely at these
independent variables, we are left with
very classic old institutional features.
These variables are then used in two
ways: in positive analysis, comparative
policy researchers use them to predict the
policy outcomes. In normative analysis,
the argument becomes that to achieve
policy change we have to operate on the
institutional levers, such as strengthening
the power of the executive. Note that
these variables do not change in the short
term, especially in periods of relative
macro-economic and political stability.
Thus, not only are we dealing with an
explanation that is excessively structural
and determinist but we also run the risk of
a static explanation: transport policy in
Spain – for example – will never change
unless we change the electoral rules or
reduce veto players via institutional re-
form.
Theoretical conjectures without foun-
dational mechanisms concerns causality
and explanation. In a continuum from
the particular to the general, this is the
more general pitfall we describe in this
article. What is the pitfall about? To
explain policy variation, we consider a
simple model of institutional causation
and associate institutional variation (the
independent variable) with policy varia-
tion. Now, this would be legitimate (but
still questionable, as we shall see in a
moment) if the authors added to the
simple model of institutional causation,
the complexity of the policy domain in a
stepwise process. The problem is that
they do the former (i.e., the simple model
of institutional causation) but not the
latter. In the end, we find powerful
explanatory institutional variables be-
cause this is what we are looking for.
Now, there is no theoretical justification
of this practice of truncating the stepwise
process at the first step of simple institu-
tional causation. The mantra that ‘institu-
tions matter’ does not qualify as theory if
all we get is institutional variation asso-
ciated with policy variation. And thinking
of the whole direction of the stepwise
process, we would argue that there is
more theoretical leverage in starting from
actors’ constellations in a given policy
domain first, and then add institutional
complexity to account for the variation
that policy-level variables do not explain.
Where does this pitfall come from? It
probably originates from the NI argument
that the structure of a nation’s political
institutions shape or frame the decision-
making context faced by policymakers.
Others move from path dependency to
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explain both stability and change; in this
vein, it is claimed that ‘institutions
define policy making in such a way that
public policy over time becomes “path
dependent” ’ (Kuipers, 2009: 165 empha-
sis added). More often than not, these
studies lack the mechanisms through
which the institutional setting explains
policy outcomes – or they provide sim-
plistic mechanistic explanations based
on incentives. It does not seem necessary
to many authors to explain how and
why the institutional setting – in Scharpf’s
(1997) terms ‘a shorthand term to
describe [y] influences’ (1997: 39) –
actually determines the outcome or at
least the behaviour of the relevant actors.
To identify such mechanisms is hard, and
we acknowledge that mechanisms are not
a necessary condition for explanation
(Gerring, 2010), but without at least
some conjectures about why the institu-
tional rules influence actors behaviour in
a specific way, for instance, by providing
selective incentives to operate in a spe-
cific way, the argument becomes circular.
Of course, institutional settings are
different and policy outcomes are diverse,
but the mere juxtaposition of these
two differences does not provide a
hypothesis, let alone an explanation.
For instance, in a recent article about
the different levels of compliance with
European directives in the field of the
electricity market in Italy and France,
Prontera (2010) suggested that the tech-
nocratic and highly institutionalised
electric energy policy in France explains
the fact that Elecricite´ de France resis-
tance against the liberalisation of the field
was strong and successful. By contrast,
in Italy the ‘central role of political parties
in policy making and in the formulation of
Enel’s business strategies’ explains why
electricity policy was much less institutio-
nalised, with the consequence of a more
rapid demise of the previous monopolistic
setting. Prima facie, the explanation
seems convincing, but if one thinks about
it the mechanism is absent: why should
one expect that in a period of deep crisis
of the party system (Italy after 1993) the
role of the powerful electricity monopolist
should be low, with the effect of not being
able to resist liberalisation? Moreover, in
another field within energy policy, oil and
gas, the picture is totally different: the
former Italian monopolist, ENI, has so far
been very successful in maintaining the
vertical integration that includes explora-
tion, extraction, transportation and dis-
tribution. The explanation of the policy
outcomes has much more to do with
policy-level variables than with any in-
stitutional variable.
Similarly, Mendez (2005) considers
variability in policy outcomes in the area
of cyber crime. His cases are Switzerland,
the European Union and the United
States, three federal systems. In order
to account for the variation in policy
outcomes, he draws on comparative
federalism. He comes to the conclusion
that the institutional characteristics
of the three different political systems
explain this new, emerging policy con-
cerned with computer viruses, virtual
infrastructures and crime on the internet.
Here we see why we insist on the public
policy dimension of the pitfall. We are
not questioning the leverage of compara-
tive federalism in terms of explanation
of the three different federal institutions
of the EU, Switzerland and the USA. There
is no problem here. The problem arises
when variation of federal institutions is
used as explanation of the variation of
policies concerning cyber crime.
The examples also alert us on the
choice of the unit of analysis. The NI
theoretical arguments about institutions
are used in studies of public policy to
situate this unit at the level of the country.
Thus, the unit of analysis is not, say,
transport policy, but Spanish transport
policy. In consequence, attention is drawn
to the institutional features of the Spanish
political system, not the policy-level
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variables (which may better explain pub-
lic policy). Within NI practice, it becomes
almost obvious to look for the character-
istics of the Spanish institutional system,
such as the cohesion of government, the
capacity of the executive to manage
social conflict, the type of political system
and the role of Courts in setting policy
agendas. It also follows that the expecta-
tion is one of limited variability between
one policy sector and another in Spain,
and high variability between Spanish
policies (e.g., transport, as well as hous-
ing and environment, to carry on with our
example) and the policies of other coun-
tries. This variability is explained by
‘institutions’. The circle is closed, but it is
the same circle of the old institutionalism.
Yet one could reason that the diffusion of
policy models have made transport policy
in Spain and Portugal more similar than
transport policy and housing policy in
Spain.
Again, the way out of these traps is to
specify carefully – as NI approaches
should do – the causal chain linking the
institutional-level variables and the policy
outcomes, necessarily passing through
the behaviour of policy actors. Otherwise
the correspondence between given insti-
tutional setting and a given policy out-
come – does not matter how frequent
it is – does not provide a true explanation,
but is indeed a theoretical conjecture
without theoretical foundations.
DISCUSSION
This state of play leads to two undesirable
outcomes, already identified by Fritz
Scharpf in his 1986 article on Policy
Failure and Institutional Reform: Why
Should Form Follow Function? The first
problem spotted by Scharpf (1986) is that
we do not have a theory that leads us
from an understanding of the institutional
variables characterising a political system
to the prediction of policy outcomes.
How does one link, conceptually, the vote
of confidence to the policy performance
in the energy sector?
This mode of analysis represents a
hindrance to the understanding of varia-
bility among policy sectors. Indeed, there
is plenty of evidence of this type of
variability. It is not true that all policies
do not perform well in, say, Italy because
there is poor administrative capacity.
Research has documented considerable
variability, even within regions and the
same sectors. Even within public admin-
istration, capacity varies (not to mention
policy performance) – an Italian study
found that two Chambers of Commerce
that operate in the same region at fifty
miles of distance exhibit different capa-
city (SPA Ricerche, 1993). Yet one cannot
say that the civil society or the organisa-
tion of the regional government differs
since the two chambers are in the same
region.
Consequently, there is a model specifi-
cation problem in designing the relation
between institutions and policies. Put
differently, the policy-level variables
that could explain variability are omitted
from the model. Institutionalist pitfalls
lead us to track down the wrong indepen-
dent variables. They also force the
(wrong) institutionalist measures to per-
form Procrustean explanatory efforts in
econometric models, as well as in small-N
institutionalist explanations – as shown
above.
The second problem is less important
for our argument – since we are only
tangentially interested in design sciences
and normative analysis. But it shows
how it can direct the minds of political
scientists towards the wrong remedies
‘Institutionalist analysis
leads us to track down
the wrong independent
variables’.
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for policy failure. As Scharpf argued, a
consequence of this type of institutional-
ist analysis is that if a policy does not
work, the solution is to manipulate the
institutional variables. Scharpf rightly
saw this as a limitation. He observed
that ‘similar outcomes may be obtained
by different policies, similar policies
may be produced by different insti-
tutional structures, and a given institu-
tional structure is capable of producing
different policy responses’ (Scharpf,
1986: 183–185). Things may indeed
improve, or they may worsen. We do not
know: yet we keep faith in the manipula-
tion of institutional variables. This ob-
viously sounds very ‘institutionalist’, but
it is not warranted by our theoretical
knowledge of institutions and their impact
on policy.
Having said that, one could respond by
observing that policies may seem to differ
sector by sector. Yet they are formulated
within the same regional or national
executive, they are all implemented by
the same class of civil servants, they are
all discussed by the same parliament
and so on. We also know how to handle
federalism and the variability of civil
society within regions of a country. Yet
this argument seems to conflate the law-
making process with the policy process.
The government and the executive are
primary actors in the discussion of a bill,
but the law that comes out of parliament
is simply a resource for the networks
or implementation structures (including
courts, competition authorities, street
level public managers, pressure groups,
experts, etc.) that will then produce policy
outcomes.
Yet law and public policy are not the
same thing. For a policy analyst, the
former is a resource used in the formula-
tion and implementation of the latter.
We have to establish empirically whether
the policy-level actors have the ability
and motivation to use this resource. In
essence, legal resources are not different
from other resources used in the policy
process, but they do not define policy.
We stress this point because of the NI
tendency to consider the law as at least
partly outside the reach of the actors.4 NI
scholars look at the law as something that
is beyond or before policy – a component
of the institutional advantage given to
some of the participants, but that is not
really ‘acted upon’ by concrete actors.
Even the authors that share a ‘contrac-
tualist’ NI – think of Elinor Ostrom –
downplay the role of the actors in the
use of the law (rules in use), and of the
institutional setting: may be at the begin-
ning, the legal rules were established
in order to secure the cooperation, but in
any given moment they are outside the
possibility of the actors to use them in a
differentiated way. What should be done
then to model correctly the role of institu-
tions in public policy? Perhaps, surpris-
ingly, we do believe that institutional
variation (both over time and across
different policies) is an important expla-
natory variable of differential policy out-
comes. For instance, the creation in the
last third of the last century of National
Departments for the Environment in
Western Europe has been a significant
step in increasing the effectiveness of
the policy. This is partly because, in this
specific case, a new actor was created,
able to operate as the advocate of envir-
onmental protection in the government,
mobilising political, legal and financial
resources. A comparative analysis of
environmental policy capacity shows that
this is a necessary – although not suffi-
cient – step for policy development
(Weidner and Ja¨nicke, 2002).
In other cases, the creation of new
institutional arrangements is the way in
which an arena is established, a forum in
which different policy actors can discuss
and negotiate policy issues, thus lowering
transaction costs and creating the
conditions for long-term adjustments
(Bressers and Kuks, 2004). Or, again,
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the institutional transformation can be
simply symbolical, but not without con-
sequences as far as policy outcomes
are concerned. This is the case in which
a mere change of label (the old wine in
new bottles’ phenomenon) has the
effect of better focusing a specific policy
problem, thus modifying the behaviour of
the existing actors and, as a conse-
quence, the results. The variation can
affect the procedure and the organisa-
tions. For instance, Knoepfel has shown
how the possibility of using direct democ-
racy (referendums and initiatives) has
altered the way in which the policy game
is played in Switzerland (Knoepfel, 2009).
All these examples have something in
common: namely, the fact that the effect
of institutional change is mediated by
the existing actors often modifying their
resources and their mutual interaction. In
other and simpler words, institutions do
play a role within the policy process
not outside it, and it is the task of the
existing actors to understand how the
existing institutional framework affects
their field of intervention, readjusting
their strategies and their tactics accord-
ingly. Institutional change is not the effect
of exogenous shocks, but brought about
by the same actors that play the sub-
stantive game. This does not mean that
‘institutional policies’ do not exist and that
they do not have their own specificities
(Knoepfel, 2009), but it is not always so
and in any case even institutional policies
have their actors, their problems, and are
played under the same veil of ignorance
about their consequences, that charac-
terises most contemporary policies.
CONCLUSIONS
In this article, we have exposed some
pitfalls that dominate NI analysis of
comparative public policy. We have found
that the NI understanding of public policy
is hindered by pitfalls concerning a lack of
theoretical arguments, the tendency to
drop countries in pre-defined boxes, in-
stitutional determinism and wrong sec-
ond-best measurement strategies. These
are not deadly sins of the original NI
paradigm, but rather pitfalls that origi-
nated in NI practice. For this reason, there
is no need to throw away the baby (of the
rich NI theoretical framework) with the
bathwater.
But our findings also suggest a way
forward in understanding the relationship
between institutions, law and public
policy. Here, perhaps it is NI theory that
needs to slightly modify its theoretical
core propositions about the institutional
effects on public policy. It is indeed classic
of NI to postulate that there is an institu-
tional domain separated from substantive
public policy, and because of this institu-
tions have policy effects.
We suggested a redirection of this way
of thinking. To recap, we argued that the
law is one of the resources in the policy
process, and it can be used, not used and
manipulated in the same way other re-
sources such as knowledge and money
are. We also argued that institutional
change has policy effects, such as the
creation of new actors, the generation of
new arenas and fora, and the redefinition
of policy problems. The same can be said
of procedural rules such as electoral laws
and referenda. Yet institutional policies
are public policies like the others (at least
at a fundamental level of how to con-
ceptualise them). They do not have
an instrumental position in relation to
substantive policy areas. By bringing
‘Institutional change is
not the effect of
exogenous shocks, but
brought about by the
same actors that play the
substantive game’.
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together institutional and policy analysis,
we can make the most of the truly ‘new’
institutionalism and shed light on the
rules of the games, the roles of different
actors, the logic of appropriateness of
the regulators and how actors get, or do
not get, locked in mechanisms of path
dependence. Exactly because these are
the effects that matter, we have to
redirect theory and rescue the new
institutionalism from the pitfalls of its
enthusiastic supporters.
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Notes
1 It is however possible to draw on classificatory types and elaborate causal explanations, but only when
one follows the specific rules of explanatory typologies (Elman, 2005).
2 For other, different critiques of the VOC framework, see the references cited in the comprehensive
overview by Hancke´ et al (2007: 3–38).
3 We are grateful to Thomas Plu¨mper for having suggested this third point in his correspondence with
Radaelli.
4 Possibly, one of the sources of this misunderstanding is the ambiguity of the concept of legal rule that
encompasses both the lex (the normative proposition binding public or private behaviours issued through
the legislative process) and the jus (the set of principles according to which the lex has to be interpreted
and acted upon). For a discussion of this distinction, see Dente (2009).
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